Abstract: This paper is about the relationship between two questions:
Introduction
The aim of this paper is to argue that the relationship between semantic theory and the question of what the objects of assertion are is less direct than it is often thought to be, and to explore the consequences of this for debates in the philosophy of language. By "semantic theory" I mean something quite precise: a compositional, truth-conditional semantic theory capable of handling both indexicality and 'shifty phenomena' of various sorts (e.g. tense and modality). Theories of this sort were first articulated and defended in the 1960s and 1970s, and are perhaps most familiar to philosophers through the work of David Kaplan (1989) and David Lewis (1980) .
The question about the objects of assertion I have in mind concerns their semantic type. Are the propositions we assert classical propositions, things that have different truth values relative to different possible worlds, but whose truth value remains invariant across time and person? Or are they, as temporalists think, temporal propositions, things that vary in truth value over both world and time? Or are they, as relativists think, judge-dependent or centered propositions, things that vary in truth value across world, time, and person? 1 A number of recent disputes in the philosophy of language -disputes over relativism and temporalism, for example -turn on the question of what the objects of assertion are. These debates typically presuppose two 'Kaplanian dogmas' about the relationship between semantics and the objects of assertion:
If the index of a semantic theory contains a parameter X (e.g. world, time, 'judge'), then the semantic theory entails that the objects of assertion vary in truth value over X.
Second Dogma:
If the index of a semantic theory does not contain a parameter X, then the semantic theory entails that the objects of assertion do not vary in truth value over X.
The index (or circumstance of evaluation) of a semantic theory is a sequence of parameters needed for stating the truth conditions of sentences containing intensional operators. If, for example, we treat modals and tenses as intensional operators, then the index will need to contain a possible world and a time. The two dogmas claim a tight connection between the question of what goes in the index and the question of what the objects of assertion are. But despite their popularity, the two dogmas are false, and this, as one might expect, has interesting consequences for the debates in question. Lewis (1980) first showed that the First Dogma was false: a parameter X might occur in the index even though the objects of assertion are 'X-specific,' they do not vary in truth value over X (section 2). This observation creates space for a type of context sensitivity that frequently goes unnoticed, one that not even Lewis himself isolated and examined. I argue that the possibility of this kind of context sensitivity -which I call shiftable context sensitivityundermines an objection relativists have made to contextualism about epistemic modals (section 3). I then argue for the converse of Lewis's point: the Second Dogma is false. Even if indices fail to contain a parameter X, the objects of assertion might nevertheless be 'X-neutral,' they might vary in truth value over X. A consequence of this is that showing that tenses or modals ought to be given an 'extensional' treatment is no argument for time-or world-specific objects of assertion, contrary to what some have thought (section 4). The resulting picture is one on which the connection between semantics and the question of what the objects of assertion are is much less direct than it is often thought to be.
Kaplan, Lewis, and 'content'
I'll begin by telling a story involving Kaplan and Lewis and the notion of the content of a sentence at a context. The upshot of the story is that we should distinguish between two notions of content, a compositional notion and an informational or assertoric notion. Put in terms of indices, the story teaches us that our First Dogma is false: putting a parameter X in the index does not commit one to X-neutral objects of assertion.
Let's start with some background. Anyone familiar with contemporary philosophy of language will know of David Kaplan's distinction between two kinds of meaning, the character and the content of an expression (Kaplan 1989) . The character of a sentence is something like a rule of use: it tells you what the sentence can be used to say when used in an arbitrary context. So the character of "It's raining today" tells you that the sentence can be used in a Monday-context to say that it's raining on Monday, in a Tuesday-context to say that it's raining on Tuesday, and so on. The notion of character plays no role in my story, however, and so I set it aside. The content of a sentence φ at a context c is, Kaplan tells us, what is said by φ at c. An utterance of "It is raining today" on Monday says that it is raining on Monday, and so the content of "It is raining today" relative to a Monday-context is the proposition that it is raining on Monday.
Although it is not entirely clear exactly what Kaplan meant by "what is said," it is tempting to read him as saying that content of a sentence φ at a context c is the central piece of information that would be communicated by an utterance of φ in c. If that's right, then contents will play a central role in a general theory of linguistic communication; they are the things we assert in speech.
2 Let me say a bit more about this role that contents are supposed to play. On a simple, schematic picture of linguistic communication, it works something like this: I believe something, p, and want you to believe it too. So I say something whose truth depends on p. If all goes well, you understand my utterance and come to believe p too (or at least realize that I want you to believe p). The information I communicate is p, and p is the content of my utterance (i.e. the content of the sentence I uttered in the context in which I uttered it). A more theoretically articulated version of this picture is Stalnaker's account of how conversation proceeds (Stalnaker 1978) . On that view, the content of an assertive utterance is what the utterance adds to the common ground, the shared body of information that is presupposed by the participants of the conversation. But given either picture, Kaplan's contents play a role in linguistic communication.
In addition to being what is said by a stand-alone sentence in a context, Kaplan assigns contents a compositional role in his formal semantic theory. Explaining this second role for contents requires some setting up. The semantic theories in which we are interested are truth-conditional and compositional. The idea of truth-conditional semantics is that to know the meaning of a sentence is to know how things would have to be in order for the sentence to be true. A truth-conditional theory for (a fragment of) English thus outputs claims like this:
The sentence "There is a bag of potatoes in the pantry" is true iff there is a bag of potatoes in the pantry.
Or -to put it in the notation familiar from formal semantics -claims like this:
There is a bag of potatoes in the pantry = 1 iff there is a bag of potatoes in the pantry.
The double brackets " " denote a function from expressions to extensions; so the above should be read as:
The extension of "There is a bag of potatoes in the pantry" is 1 (truth) iff there is a bag of potatoes in the pantry.
A compositional semantic theory shows how to compute the truth-conditions of a sentence from the meanings or semantic values of its parts, the primitive lexical items contained in the sentence. The theories of Kaplan and Lewis are compositional, truth-conditional theories that are distinguished by their ability to treat two sets of linguistic phenomena: context sensitive expressions and shifty phenomena like tense and modality. They do this by relativising the relevant notion of truth in two different ways. Consider first context-sensitive expressions like "I", "here", and "now". Note that a sentence like "I am hungry" does not have truth-conditions absolutely, as it were, but only relative to potential contexts of utterance. For whether a particular utterance of that sentence is true or not depends not only on who is hungry when, but on who the speaker is and the time at which the utterance occurs. The sentence is true relative to a context iff the speaker of the context is hungry at the time of the context. So a semantic theory capable of handling context-sensitive expressions will state the truth-conditions of sentences relative to contexts. This means that the output of our semantic theory will now look something like this:
I am hungry c = 1 iff the speaker of c is hungry at the time of c at the world of c.
The double brackets " " now denote a two-place function taking expressioncontext pairs to extensions. For most purposes, we can identify a context c with a quadruple consisting of a world w c , a time t c , a speaker x c , and a location l c , where x c is at l c at t c in w c . This will allow us to treat modal ("actually"), temporal ("now"), and locative ("here") indexicals in a manner similar to our treatment of "I".
The second type of phenomena these theories aim to treat is what I'm calling shifty phenomena, which I take to include modality, tense, and locative expressions (e.g. "In Boston"). Take a sentence like (1):
1. Sam could have been a philosopher.
On standard treatments, (1) decomposes into a modal operator and an embedded sentence:
Possibly [Sam is a philosopher]
Unlike the familiar logical connectives ("and", "not", etc.), "possibly" cannot be treated as a function from truth values to truth values. For what would the function be? It should map truth to truth, since actuality entails possibility, but what should it map falsity to? There are two options: it maps falsity to falsity or falsity to truth. The first gets the wrong result when the embedded sentence is false but contingent, the second when the embedded sentence is necessarily false. So the semantic value of "Sam is a philosopher" -what it contributes to the truth-conditions of (1) -cannot simply be its extension (truth value).
It is here where we encounter the second role for Kaplan's contents. The idea of intensional semantics is to treat the semantic value of a sentence embedded under an operator like "possibly" not as a truth value (extension) but as something that (potentially) takes different truth values at different possible worlds or indices (intension). The meaning of "possibly" can then be understood as a function from these semantic values to truth values: it maps the semantic value of a sentence φ to truth iff there is a world at which the semantic value of φ is true. So (2) is true iff there is a world w such that the semantic value of "Sam is a philosopher" is true at w. A similar treatment can be given to tenses and locative expressions: we take the semantic values of sentences to be things that (potentially) take different truth values at different times and locations, and treat tenses and location expressions as functions from these variable semantic values to truth values. The second role of Kaplan's contents is to serve as these variable semantic values; Kaplan's contents are the inputs to intensional operators.
A standard way of implementing this idea formally involves further relativising the relevant notion of truth, so that our semantics now characterises the notion of truth relative to a context and an index. If we treat tenses and location expressions along the lines of modal operators like "possibly", then an index i will be a triple of a possible world w i , a time t i , and a location l i .
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3 Since both context and index are sequences of broadly similar sorts of parameters, one might wonder why both are needed. Why not simply have one set of parameters that plays the role of both context and index? The reason is that indexicals tend not to shift under intensional operators: "It will always be the case that Sam is now hungry" has no reading on which it means that Sam will always be hungry, a prediction not generated by a singly-indexed semantics (see Cresswell (1990) for more detail).
Note that even if natural languages contain monsters -operators that shift the the context parameter -the standard arguments for 'double-indexing' go through, since all they require is that some indexicals fail to shift under some operators. Arguments for monsters are discussed in Schlenker (1999 Schlenker ( , 2003 , Anand and Nevins (2004) , and Anand (2006) . 4 It is currently a matter of controversy as to which expressions (if any) should be treated as index-shifting operators, and what (if anything) should go in the index (e.g. King 2003; Schaffer Forthcominga) . This issue will be discussed in more detail in §4.
Kaplan then defines the content of a sentence φ at a context c as a function that maps an index i to truth iff φ is true at c and i:
So the content of φ at c can take different truth values at different possible worlds, times, and locations, as desired. And the truth conditions of (1) can now be compositionally generated as follows:
There is a world w (accessible from
There is a world w (accessible from w i ) such that Sam is a philosopher c, w,ti,li = 1 iff
There is a world w (accessible from w i ) such that Sam is a philosopher at t i in w.
Note the role played by the Kaplanian content of "Sam is a philosopher" in the second and third lines of this derivation. Temporal and locative expressions can be given a parallel treatment. So the content of a sentence plays two roles in Kaplan's overall theory: it plays a compositional role in the semantics proper, as the input to intensional operators, and it plays a role in the theory of linguistic communication, as the assertoric content of a sentence at a context. One of the central lessons in David Lewis's paper "Index, Context, and Content" (Lewis 1980 ) is that these two roles place very different demands on what we can take contents to be. Since contents are the objects of assertion, they will have to be responsive to our views about what the objects of thought and talk are like. If, for example, we think that the information we normally convey in speech is time-specific, i.e. not something that changes its truth value over time, then we will want contents to likewise be time-specific. But since Kaplanian contents are also the inputs to operators, they must also be sensitive to what kinds of operators natural language contains. For example, if natural language contains temporal operators, then indices will have to contain time parameters, and so contents will be functions from time-containing indices to truth values. Thus, if natural language contains temporal operators, contents will have to be time-neutral, i.e. things that change their truth value over time.
So there is potential conflict between the two jobs Kaplan's contents are intended to play. If they fulfill the assertion role, they may not suitable for playing the compositional role, but if they fulfill the compositional role, they may not be suitable for playing the assertion role. For Lewis, this conflict took on a specific form. He needed highly variable contents to play the compositional role, since he thought natural language should be understood as containing modal, temporal, locative, and standards-of-precision operators. But he needed highly specific contents to play the assertion role, since, following Stalnaker (1978) , he took the objects of thought and talk to be possible worlds propositions.
6 But Lewis's specific commitments on these two matters are less important than the general point that the assertion role and the compositional role might place incompatible demands on a singular notion of content.
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Lewis offered a simple solution to this problem: drop the requirement that a single object -the content -play both these roles. Define one kind of object -assertoric content -to play the assertion role, and define a second kindsemantic value -to play the compositional role. 9 If we accept this identification then an analogue of our First Dogma will hold true for semantic values: if a parameter X occurs in the index, semantic values will be X-neutral. Second question: what is the assertoric content of a sentence at a context? What are the objects of assertion? How we answer this question will be influenced by our independent views about the what the objects of thought and talk are. Since Lewis took the objects of thought and talk to be possible worlds propositions, he defined the assertoric content of a sentence at a context as follows:
Here what we've done is taken the Kaplanian content of φ at c and 'fixed' the time and location parameters to the values supplied by the context, t c and l c .
This process leaves us with the possible worlds proposition that Lewis takes to be the assertoric content of φ at c.
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Two points are important here. First, note that it follows immediately from Lewis's picture that the First Dogma discussed at the outset of the paper is false. Even if a parameter X occurs in the index, the objects of assertion need not be X-neutral. On Lewis's picture, indices contain time and location parameters, but the objects of assertion are neither time-neutral nor locationneutral. They are neutral only with respect to possible world. Second, once we see that we can separate semantic values from assertoric contents, we see that no particular definition of assertoric content, Lewis's included, is forced upon us by the semantics. The semantics constrains what we can take the assertoric content to be -assuming we want that notion to be definable in terms of the semantic theory -but it does not determine a unique candidate for playing that role. Lewis identified the assertoric content of φ at c with a possible worlds proposition that he defined in a particular way, but different theorists might adopt different accounts of assertoric content, depending on their antecedent views about the objects of thought and talk.
A temporalist, for example, might say that assertoric content of φ at c is the temporal proposition of φ at c, defined as follows:
This is a function from world-time pairs to truth values, something that varies truth value over times. And theorists impressed by the centered worlds account of de se attitudes (Lewis 1979 ) may think that the centered diagonal proposition of φ at c plays an important role in communication (Heim 2004 , Ninan 2010 ):
Centered Diagonal Proposition of φ at c: λ w, t, x . φ w,t,x,lc , w,t,lc How do we choose between these options? What constrains our 'antecedent views' about what the objects of thought and talk are like? This is a large question, and not one I can take up in depth here. But let me name two places to look. First, we might look at a different part of semantics: the semantics of attitude and indirect speech reports, and the semantics of epistemic modals. If there is not a close connection between the objects of psychological attitudes and the way we talk about those attitudes, then we will be left with an implausible error theory. Second, we might look to the philosophy of mind, in particular to that branch of the philosophy of mind that deals with the problem of intentionality and the nature of mental content.
Two further comments: First, it might be that there is no such thing as the assertoric content of a sentence at a context. One might, for example, think that possible worlds propositions and temporal propositions both have a role to play in theorizing about linguistic communication (see footnote 10 for another example). Second, nothing we've said so far rules out the possibility that the semantic value of a sentence will in fact coincide with its assertoric content. It could turn out that our best semantic theory requires semantic values to be of type T , and that our best theory of linguistic communication tells us that assertoric contents are also things of type T . What I am suggesting is that things don't have to be this way.
It might be worth pointing out that, on my Lewisian set-up, the definition of assertoric content has a status similar to Kaplan's definition of truth at a context. Note that our semantics proper defines the notion of truth at a context and index. But suppose someone in context c says, "Sam is a philosopher". What is the index relevant for determining whether or not this sentence is true in this context? At least in the normal case, the answer is that it is the index determined by the context that matters. To find the index determined by a context c, we simply set the value of each index parameter to its corresponding context parameter. So given a context c, the index determined by c is simply w c , t c , l c . This yields Kaplan's definition of truth at a context: A sentence φ is true at a context c iff φ c, wc,tc,lc = 1
But note that the notion of truth at context simpliciter (as opposed to truth a context and index) plays no role in our formal semantics proper, the compositional derivation of truth-conditions. Rather, it is a notion that is defined only once we have the semantic theory in hand; it is part of the postsemantics, to use the terminology of MacFarlane (2003, 329) . I propose that the definition of assertoric content also be regarded as part of the postsemantics, and that it's theoretical significance is comparable to that of the definition of truth at a context.
To summarize: Lewis showed that we can and should distinguish between the semantic value of a sentence at a context and the assertoric content of a sentence at a context. He argued that those notions come apart in a particular way, but the details of his specific views are less important than the general conceptual point that these are two distinct notions that we should not conflate. Lewis's discussion also shows that our First Dogma is false, since one can put a parameter X in the index while rejecting the view that the objects of assertion are X-neutral. This functional notion of the content of a sentence in a context may not, because of the neutrality with respect to time and place, say, exactly correspond to the classical conception of a proposition. But the classical conception can be introduced by adding the demonstratives 'now' and 'here' to the sentence and taking the content of the result. (Kaplan 1989, 504) (Also see p. 546.) What Kaplan doesn't say (though surely realised) is that the content of a sentence φ at a context c so defined is not the semantic value of φ at c, i.e. not what φ contributes to larger structures in which it is embedded. Perhaps if Kaplan had expanded on these remarks, he would have ended up with a distinction much like Lewis's. 3 Indices and epistemic modals I will return to the Second Dogma in this next section. But first I want to explore the consequences of the failure of the First Dogma.
As I noted at the outset of the paper, Lewis's observation creates space for a type of context sensitivity that tends to get overlooked in the literature, a type of context sensitivity which even Lewis himself did not isolate and examine. This type of context sensitivity is relevant to the recent debate over epistemic modals because it enables us to formulate a type of contextualism that is immune to an objection that relativists have made against more familiar forms of contextualism. The particular objection to contextualism that I have in mind is based on arguments in Egan et al. (2005) and Weatherson (2008) , though I will formulate the problem in my own way.
Problems for traditional contextualism
Contextualists about epistemic modals say that sentences like (2) express different propositions in different contexts:
2. Sam might be in Boston.
For concreteness, and to set up the contrast with relativism, let's suppose that the contextualist holds that (2) expresses a possible worlds proposition. There are two questions contextualists need to answer: (i) What proposition does (2) express in an arbitrary context? and (ii) How are the mechanics of the context dependency of (2) to be understood?
Let me start with the first question. The standard view is that "might" expresses existential quantification over a set of possibilities compatible with some contextually relevant body of knowledge, so that (2) says that there is a relevant possibility in which Sam is in Boston. The first question concerns whose knowledge is relevant for determining the set of possibilities over which the modal quantifies. One plausible constraint on any answer to this question is what Egan et al. (2005) call the speaker inclusion constraint, which says that at least the speaker's knowledge is relevant. If this constraint holds, then (2) is true only if it is compatible with what the speaker knows that Sam is in Boston. If this is right, then (2) either means something like "it is compatible with what I know that Sam is in Boston" (if only the speaker matters) or "it is compatible with what we know that Sam is in Boston" (if parties in addition to the speaker matter). We can say that a proposition is known by a group iff every member of the group knows the proposition.
As Weatherson (2008, 534) points out, one motivation for the speaker inclusion constraint is that it provides us with a neat explanation of the infelicity of Moore-paradoxical "might"-sentences like (3):
3. # Sam is in Boston, but he might not be.
If the speaker inclusion constraint holds, then we can explain the infelicity of (3) along the following lines: In uttering the first conjunct, the speaker represents herself as knowing that Sam is in Boston (Kp), perhaps because knowledge is the norm of assertion in the sense of Williamson (2000, Ch. 11) . If the speaker inclusion constraint holds, then in uttering the second conjunct, the speaker says that it is compatible with what she knows that Sam is not in Boston (¬K¬¬p). And that implies that she does not know that he is in Boston (¬Kp). So the sentence is infelicitous because the speaker at once represents herself as knowing that Sam is in Boston and as not knowing that he is in Boston.
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What about the second question? How does the context dependence of "might" work? Is "might" a simple indexical like "I" or "today"? On the indexical hypothesis, the semantics for "might" might look like this: might φ c,i = 1 iff there is a possible world w compatible what the relevant group in c (which includes x c ) knows at t i in w i such that φ is true at w.
Unfortunately, this hypothesis is more or less refuted by the fact that the set of possibilities over which "might" quantifies appears to shift when "might" is embedded under attitude verbs, attitude verbs which don't appear to monstrously shift the relevant parameters of the context. Consider a sentence like (4): 4. John thinks that Sam might be in Boston.
Arguably, the truth of (4) in a context c does not require John to think that it is compatible with what the relevant group in c knows that Sam is in Boston (Egan et al. 2005; Stephenson 2007 ). All that the truth of (4) requires is that John thinks that it is compatible with what he (John) knows that Sam is in Boston.
But that interpretation won't be predicted on the indexical view, since the set of possibilities over which the modal quantifies is tied to the context parameter c, and c does not appear to shift under "thinks" in the appropriate way. To see this, note that (5) does not mean what (4) means, as it should if the indexical account were correct and "thinks" monstrously shifted the relevant parameters of the context:
John thinks that it is compatible with what I/we know that Sam is in
Boston.
So the indexical account would appear to be wrong. Instead, contextualists might hold that sentences like (2) contain a hidden variable in the structure which is assigned a value by a contextually determined variable assignment. So far, we have not included variable assignments in our points of evaluation, but we would need to in order to treat quantificational expressions. We also assume that free pronouns and hidden variables receive a value from the variable assignment, which is itself determined by the context of utterance (via intentions, salience, pointing, etc.).
14 On this proposal, "might φ" has the following logical form and semantics:
There is a world w compatible with what g(x) knows at t i in w i such that φ c, w,ti,li ,g = 1
Here, g is the contextually determined variable assignment. How does this proposal help account for the fact that "might" shifts under "thinks" in (4)? There are two ways the present proposal can predict the right truth conditions for (4). First, the hidden variable might be free, in which case the variable assignment can assign it John. The result will be a reading on which (4) is true iff John thinks it is compatible with what he (John) knows that Sam is in Boston, as desired. Alternatively, the sentence might have this structure:
John λx x thinks [might x Sam is in Boston]
If the sentence has this structure, it will again be true iff John thinks it is compatible with what he (John) knows that Sam is in Boston. So the hidden variable account is superior to the indexical account, insofar as it permits the set of worlds which the modal quantifies over in (4) to be the set of worlds compatible with what John thinks he knows.
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But as Weatherson points out, the speaker inclusion constraint poses a difficulty for this proposal. We noted earlier that the infelicity of Moore-paradoxical "might"-sentences motivates the adoption of that constraint. But in order for the hidden variable account to predict the speaker inclusion constraint more will have to be said about the semantics of the hidden variable. For if the semantics places no constraints on what value the hidden variable can take in unembedded sentences, it is hard to see how the account will satisfy the constraint.
Often when a hidden variable is posited, we want this sort of flexibility, in order to model the fact that there are very few constraints on what the context 14 We might wish to regard the variable assignment as a coordinate of either the context or the index.
15 One problem with this proposal is that it doesn't make the shift obligatory, since nothing has been said to rule out the possibility that the variable is free and is assigned someone other than John. This is a problem because it seems that (4) can only be read as saying something about what John thinks is compatible with his knowledge. It cannot be read as saying something about what John thinks is compatible with the knowledge of someone salient-in-c. I leave this problem aside here, but see footnote 18 for further discussion.
is permitted to assign as a value to the variable. This point is often made in connection with the adjective "local" which many theorists believe combines with a hidden variable over individuals, so that "local" always means "local relative to x". Flexibility is a virtue in this case, since if an individual x is salient in the context, "local" can almost always means "local relative to x" (Egan et al. 2005, 149; Portner 2009, 180) .
But given that we accept the speaker inclusion constraint, we want to avoid such flexibility in the present case. Mere salience cannot be enough to make something the value of the hidden variable associated with "might", otherwise (3) (repeated below) would have a reading on which it was acceptable.
For surely Sam will be salient in any context in which (3) is uttered, in which case (3) should have a reading on which it says: Sam is in Boston, but it is compatible with what he knows that he's not in Boston. But, as Weatherson observes, the sentence has no such reading since it is simply infelicitous (534).
Overt pronouns provide a model for how to semantically constrain the value of a variable, since it is widely agreed that there are semantic constraints on the application of overt pronouns. For example, when free, "she" can only refer to a contextually salient female. A standard way of capturing this generalization in the semantics is to assume that "she" has a feminine phi-feature, which is interpreted as a presupposition on the acceptable referents for the pronoun (e.g. Heim and Kratzer 1998, 125, 244) :
(A note on this notation: This essentially means that she 2 is a partial function from c, i, g -triples to individuals. The function is only defined for a given c, i, g if g maps 2 to a female; where defined it maps c, i, g to g(2).) Thus, one could try to capture the speaker inclusion constraint by holding that the hidden pronoun has a first-person (singular or plural) phi-feature requiring its value to be either the speaker or a group that includes the speaker. Let the h i be the hidden variables associated with "might." Then we have the following:
The resulting account will satisfy the speaker inclusion constraint, and so explain the infelicity of sentences like (3). For any variable assignment which assigns to the hidden variable associated with "might" a group that does not include the speaker will violate the presupposition on the hidden variable. The problem with this proposal is that it jeopardizes the hidden variabilist's account of sentences in which an epistemic modal appears in the scope of an attitude verb, sentences like (4) (repeated here):
4. John thinks that Sam might be in Boston.
We noted two ways the hidden variable contextualist could handle (4). The first is to say that the hidden variable is free and is assigned John by the context. But we can no longer say this, at least not in general. For suppose (4) is uttered in a context in which John is neither the speaker nor party to the conversation in any way. Since on the present account the hidden variable has a presupposition which requires it to pick out (a group that includes) the speaker, if the variable is assigned John, the presupposition will fail, and the sentence will be neither true nor false. But surely there are contexts in which John is not party to the conversation and in which (4) is true.
The second way we suggested the hidden variable account might treat (4) involves assigning it the following structure:
John λx x thinks [might x Sam is in Boston]
But this proposal is also problematic. For in addition to constraining what a free pronoun can refer to, a pronoun's phi-features also constrain what sorts of antecedents can bind it.
16 For example, "her" can be bound by "every girl", but not by "every boy": 6. (a) Every girl i loves her i mother. 
(a) Only we got a question we understood.
Bound reading ≈ We got a question we understood and for all groups x (x = us → x didn't get a question that x understood.) (b) Only they got a question we understood.
No bound reading available.
So if the hidden variable associated with "might" possessed the first-person phi-feature, then we would expect to observe some constraints on what sort of antecedent could bind it. In particular, we might expect that it could be bound by an antecedent containing a first-person pronoun, but not otherwise. But then the hidden variabilist's proposed structure for (4) is illicit, since it has a proper name ("John") binding a pronoun with first-person phi-features. Since those elements do not exhibit phi-featural agreement -(7b) shows that "John" does not possess the first-person phi-feature -such binding will be prohibited. 
Shiftable contextualism
In essence, the relativist is arguing that the contextualist is unable to accommodate two pieces of data: a. The fact that "John thinks Sam might be in Boston" is true iff John thinks it is compatible with what he (John) knows that Sam is in Boston.
b. The infelicity of Moore-paradoxical "might" sentences like (3).
Data point (a) by itself scuppered the initial indexical account which we considered, and points (a) and (b) together created a dilemma for the hidden variable contextualist. In order to explain (b), the hidden variabilist needed to claim that the hidden variable associated with "might" possesses the first-person phifeature. But the latter claim seemed to prevent the hidden variabilist from explaining (a). The hidden variable in (4) can't be free, for otherwise it would have to take the speaker as value, given that the variable has the first-person phi-feature. Nor can the hidden variable in (4) be bound by "John", since those two elements do not exhibit phi-featural agreement. But contextualism is not sunk. I will argue that what I shall call shiftable contextualism offers an elegant treatment of both pieces of data. If that's right, then (a) and (b) do not constitute argument against contextualism after allthey only constitute an argument against specific versions of contextualism. Shiftable contextualism consists of two components: (i) a semantic theory, and (ii) a definition of assertoric content. After outlining shiftable contextualism, I'll come back to say why relativists might have thought that (a) and (b) provided motivation for relativism. As you might suspect, I think the First Dogma is the main culprit here.
The semantics begins by expanding the index so that it includes an individual (or a 'judge'). So an index i is now a triple consisting of a world w i , a time t i , and an individual x i (I ignore the location parameter for simplicity). The next step is to make the meaning of "might" sensitive to the individual parameter in the right way. One simple way to do this is to write it directly into the lexical entry of "might":
17 The main divergence between my discussion and Weatherson's concerns this point about bound variables. He writes: "Semantic constraints on indexical terms [pronouns] hold, as a rule, for both embedded and unembedded uses of those indexicals" (534). It's not clear that this is true, however, since on standard ways of accounts of sentences like (7a), there are points of evaluation c, i, g relative to which the first-person pronoun "my" does not pick out the speaker of c (see e.g. Heim 2008 ). But it is presumably a semantic constraint on the first-person pronoun that it pick out the speaker when not bound. What is true is that a pronoun's phi-features give rise to constraints on what sorts of antecedents can bind it, a fact which, as we've seen, does create a problem for the hidden variable hypothesis. 3. # Sam is in Boston, but he might not be.
To explain how shiftable contextualism handles this, we should say something about the shiftable contextualist's definition of assertoric content.
As a genuine contextualist (as opposed to relativist), the shiftable contextualist wants the assertoric content of an epistemically modalized sentence to be something that does not vary in truth value across individuals. Let's assume that the shiftable contextualist wants the assertoric content of a sentence at a context to be a possible worlds proposition. To achieve this end, the shiftable contextualist can adopt Lewis's definition of assertoric content: the assertoric content of a sentence at a context is the proposition one gets by abstracting over the world parameter in the index while setting all the other index parameters to their corresponding context values. If we assume that the 'corresponding context value' for the individual parameter of the index is the speaker, a simple "might"-claim like (2) will express the following proposition:
λw. might [Sam is in Boston]
c, w,tc,xc ,g = λw. there is a world w compatible with what x c knows at t c in w such that Sam is in Boston in w .
The modal ends up quantifying over the worlds compatible with what the speaker knows. This is because the lexical entry for "might" ensures that it quantifies over the worlds compatible with what the individual in the index knows, and that parameter is set to the speaker in the definition of assertoric content.
So the account satisfies the speaker inclusion constraint, which means we can explain the infelicity of (3) just as we did earlier. In uttering the first conjunct, the speaker represents herself as knowing that Sam is in Boston (Kp). But the second conjunct expresses the proposition that it is compatible with what the speaker knows that Sam is not in Boston (¬K¬¬p). So in uttering the second conjunct, the speaker implies that she does not know that Sam is in Boston (¬Kp). The sentence is infelicitous because in uttering it, the speaker is bound to represent her epistemic state in an inconsistent way.
So the shiftable contextualist about epistemic modals can explain both the infelicity of sentences like (3), and the fact that the interpretation of "might" shifts under attitude verbs. That means that this version of contextualism escapes the relativist's argument.
While slightly non-standard, this account is contextualist because sentences like (2) express different propositions in different contexts, propositions which do not vary in truth value across individuals. "Shiftable" is appropriate since the individual whose knowledge is relevant for interpreting the modal can be (non-monstrously) shifted from its default value (the speaker) by an attitude operator. In general, shiftable contextualism about an expression e will arise whenever two conditions obtain: (i) e is sensitive to parameter X of the index, but (ii) parameter X is fixed to its corresponding context value in the definition of assertoric content. Lewis's own specific combination of views gives rise to shiftable contextualism about any expression that is sensitive to the time, location, or standards-of-precision parameter of the index. Shiftable contextualism about epistemic modals tends to get overlooked in the literature on these topics.
19 Why is that? Recall the First Dogma: if indices contain a parameter X, then the objects of assertion must be X-neutral. If you assume that something like the First Dogma is true, you will overlook the possibility of shiftable contextualism. The First Dogma say that since the semantics adopted by the shiftable contextualist about epistemic modals has an individual parameter in the index, the shiftable 'contextualist' must hold that the objects of assertion are 'individual-neutral' (and so is not really a contextualist at all). More specifically, if you identify Kaplanian content (semantic value) with assertoric content, you get the result that the assertoric content of (2) is a centered proposition (cf. line (b) of the derivation on p. 16):
c, w,t,x ,g = λ w, t, x . it is compatible with what x knows at t in w that Sam is in Boston.
But this isn't compatible with contextualism, since on this view the assertoric content of (2) doesn't vary across contexts. Rather, this view is a form of relativism about epistemic modals, relativism being the view that the assertoric content of a sentence like (2) varies in truth value across individuals.
20 If the assertoric content of (2) is the above individual-neutral proposition, the result is relativism. That individual-neutral proposition could be true for me (if I don't know where Sam is), but false for you (if you know he's in London).
Thus, if you assume the First Dogma, you will simply overlook the possibility of a position like shiftable contextualism. But as we saw in the last section, the First Dogma is false: simply accepting that a certain parameter X appears in the index does not commit one to X-neutral assertoric contents. Thus, simply accepting the 'individual in the index' semantics does not commit one to relativism. A contextualist can accept that semantics so long as she is careful about how she defines the assertoric content of a sentence at a context. 20 On this way of carving things up, nonindexical contextualism and assessment relativism are both species of relativism (see MacFarlane (2009) for this distinction). Those two positions differ on the definition of truth at a context, but agree on what the assertoric content of a sentence at a context is. Since I'm largely interested in the connection between semantics and assertoric content, it makes sense to gloss over that distinction in the present context. (For general skepticism about the utility of the distinction between nonindexical contextualism and assessment relativism, see Cappelen and Hawthorne (2009, 20 -24) .) I should mention that Portner (2009, 178ff.) responds to a similar anti-contextualist argument by pointing out that Tamina Stephenson's (2007) semantics evades that argument. But Stephenson's view would count as a version of relativism on the taxonomy adopted here.
Extensional semantics and the objects of assertion
So far we've been examining the First Dogma and what its failure means for the debate over epistemic modals. We now turn our attention to the Second Dogma, which says that if the index does not contain a parameter X, then the objects of assertion must be X-specific. Whether the Second Dogma is true is an interesting question in light of the recent trend among linguists and philosophers towards extensional treatments of shifty phenomena like tense and modality. So far we've been assuming the traditional intensional approach to these expressions, an approach pioneered by Kaplan and Lewis, among others. But in recent years, a number of linguists and philosophers have argued that shifty phenomena like tense and modality ought be treated extensionally, i.e. within a system of object language quantifiers and variables that range over times and worlds. Instead of having worlds and times in the index, an extensional system has world and time variables appearing explicitly in the syntax (think of the difference between modal logic, on the one hand, and a first-order theory that employs explicit quantification over possible worlds, on the other).
There are at least two motivations for moving towards an extensional treatment of a given shifty phenomenon. The first is that there are certain parallels between the shifty phenomenon in question, on the one hand, and ordinary pronouns ("he", "she", etc.), on the other. This point has been most extensively pursued in connection with tense (Partee 1973; Kratzer 1998) , but a similar case has also been made for modality (Stone 1997; Schlenker 2006 ). In the case of tense, theorists have pointed out that, like pronouns, tenses give rise to deictic readings, anaphoric readings, bound readings, and 'pseudo-bound' (or 'donkey') readings. And tenses, like pronouns, can lose interpretable phi-features under binding (sequence of tense). Given these striking parallels, goes this argument, tenses and pronouns ought to be treated in a parallel fashion. Since pronouns are treated within an extensional system, tenses should likewise be treated extensionally. A similar argument can be made in the modal case.
The second argument concerns expressive power and more general theoretical virtues. So far we've been considering quite simple intensional semantic theories, theories with a context and single index. A number of argumentssummarized in Cresswell (1990) -show that such theories cannot model the full expressive power of natural language. Indeed, Cresswell argues that natural language possesses the expressive power of a language that has explicit quantification over times and possible worlds. This by itself does not motivate an extensional treatment, however, since Cresswell also shows how an intensional theory can be enriched so that it has the expressive power of an extensional system. However, some theorists have suggested that extensional theories should nevertheless be preferred to rich intensional theories on grounds of explanatory power, simplicity, and elegance. For example, Kusumoto (2005, 354 -355) tentatively suggests that extensional approaches to tense may be in a better position to explain data concerning the temporal interpretation of nouns in argument position and noun-modifying participles, while King (2003, 221 -223) argues that extensional theories of tense are simpler, more elegant, and more faithful to surface structure than their intensional counterparts.
My interest here is not in deciding whether or not we should adopt an extensional theory of tense and/or modality. Rather, I am interested in what the trend towards extensional treatments of shifty phenomena might mean for what we can take the objects of assertion to be. If tense, for example, ought to be treated extensionally, then indices would no longer contain times. If the Second Dogma is true, this would mean that the objects of assertion are time-specific. A similar argument could be run from an extensional account of modality to the claim that the objects of assertion are world -specific.
Indeed, several theorists have made claims of this sort, assuming something like our Second Dogma.
21 Consider, for example, the dispute between Recanati (2004) and Stanley (2005) over temporalism, the doctrine that the objects of assertion vary in truth value across times.
22 In his discussion, Recanati considers an objection to temporalism which says that if contents were neutral with respect to time, then they would not be truth-evaluable, because they would be incomplete. Recanati responds by pointing out that this argument fails if circumstances of evaluation contain times, because then time-neutral contents could still be evaluated for truth relative to a circumstance:
Once it is admitted that we need a circumstance over and above the content to be evaluated, we can part with Frege and, following Prior, tolerate contents that are not 'semantically complete' in Frege's sense, that is, endowed with absolute truth-conditions. We can, because the circumstance is there which enables the content to be suitably completed. Thus the content of tensed sentences is semantically incomplete, yet the circumstance (the time) relative to which such a sentence is evaluated is sufficient to complete it. (Recanati 2004, 122) Stanley responds that since tenses ought to be treated extensionally, indices do not contain times, and so Recanati's defense of temporalism is undermined:
The problem with Recanati's appeal to circumstances of evaluation to justify incomplete semantic contents is that it is in tension with much of current linguistic research... most linguists hold, contra Recanati, that tenses are not operators, and times are part of semantic content, rather than being features of circumstances of evaluation... Recanati must show this entire line of research to be incorrect. In particular, he must demonstrate the viability of (say) an operator account of phenomena, such as sequence of tense, which have led researchers to treat tenses as predicates of times or events. This is a substantial obstacle to Recanati's program. Indeed, one way of seeing the debate between indexicalism [Stanley's view] and contextualism [Recanati's view] is that the indexicalist position is the natural descendant of the trend in linguistic theory (starting with Partee (1973) ) away from operator approaches of tense, and relativity of content generally, and towards explicit syntactic representation of elements that were once thought of as features of circumstances of evaluation.
23 (Stanley 2005, 245) As I understand this passage, Stanley argues that since tenses should be treated extensionally, contents should be thought of as time-specific ("times are part of semantic content"). Stanley also sees the move "away from operator approaches to tense" as part of a more general move away from the "relativity of content." As we move away from intensional approaches towards extensional ones, contents become less 'relative,' in the sense that their truth values are specified relative to a fewer number of parameters. All this suggests that Stanley thinks something like our Second Dogma is true, and that an extensional treatment of a parameter X leads to X-specific contents.
In his influential (2003) paper, King endorses an analogue of the Second Dogma, one which says that if indices do not contain a parameter X, then semantic values must be X-specific:
I shall argue that temporal expressions (including tenses) and location expressions are not best understood as sentence operators that shift features of the index of evaluation. If this is correct, then indices do not need to contain times or locations for such purported operators to shift... This leaves only worlds and standards of precision as coordinates of indices. And this, in turn, leaves us with the view that variable but simple semantic values of sentences are, or determine, functions from worlds and standards of precision to truth-values. (215) Since functions from worlds and standards are location-and time-specific, King's semantic values are location-and time-specific. This suggests that King thinks that if indices fail to contain location-and time-parameters, then semantic values will be location-and time-specific, an analogue of the Second Dogma. Although this principle concerns semantic values rather than assertoric content, it is obviously closely related to the Second Dogma, especially in light of the overall aim of King's paper, which is to defend the identity of semantic value and assertoric content.
But what exactly is the argument for the move from 'no X parameter in the index' to 'X-specific assertoric contents' or to 'X-specific semantic values' ? Why should we think anything like the Second Dogma is true? To answer this question, it will help to look at a specific example. I'll consider the case of 23 I should note that it is not clear to me that Recanati's argument requires that there be a time parameter in the indices employed in the semantics proper, as Stanley seems to assume. All the argument requires is the idea that 'it takes two to make a truth' (Austin 1971, 124 )-a content and a thing relative to which we can evaluate that content for truth. We might call that latter object a circumstance of evaluation, but circumstances in this sense need not be the same sorts of things as the indices that figure in the semantics proper.
tense, and, in particular, a slight variant of the extensional semantics for tense discussed in Kusumoto (1999, Ch.1) .
To see how that theory works, consider a past tensed sentence like (9):
9. Elliot danced.
On the proposed analysis, (9) has the following logical form:
Each predicate takes a time argument: t 2 is a time variable and an argument of "dances" and t * is an argument of the past tense. t * is a designated element that directly picks out the utterance time (cf. Dowty 1982; King 2003) :
Note that in this system, indices contain only worlds. The past tense receives the following lexical entry:
there is a time t < t such that p(t ) = 1.
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Here p is a meta-language variable ranging over functions from times to truth values, and t a meta-language variable ranging over times (times are of type r). Given this semantics, the extension of (9) at a point of evaluation is a truth value: t * past λt 2 t 2 Elliot dances c,wi,g = 1 iff there is a time t < t c such that Elliot dances at t in w i .
And since the index contains only a world, abstracting over the index yields a function from worlds to truth values, i.e. a possible worlds proposition:
there is a time t < t c such that Elliot danced at t in w.
Since possible worlds propositions are time-specific, it would appear that contents on this account are time-specific. Stanley et al. presumably have an argument like this in mind when they suggest that an extensional account of tense is incompatible with time-neutral assertoric contents (or with time-neutral semantic values in King's case). It's worth pointing that even if one is happy with this particular result -eternalism about assertoric content -one might be concerned about this general style of argument, since, as Schaffer (Forthcominga) points out, a parallel argument can be made for the claim that the objects of assertion are world-specific. But many theorists will be less pleased with that result. For most philosophers assume, for a variety of different reasons, that the objects of thought and talk are things that can vary in truth value across possible worlds. For example, one needs assertoric contents to determine contingent possible worlds propositions if one wants to model assertions as attempts to remove possible worlds from the 'context set,' in the sense of Stalnaker (1978) .
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I think that this style of argument can be resisted, and that the Second Dogma is in fact false. I will sketch two ways a temporalist can reconcile her views about the objects of assertion with an extensional theory of tense. These strategies will both generalize to the modal case, and so my argument also shows that advocates of world-neutral propositions have nothing to fear from extensional accounts of modality. Only one of the two strategies extends to King's analogue of the Second Dogma, and so I begin with that one.
In the extensional theory of tense we considered, it was assumed the temporal indexical t * occurred at the top of each structure. But this not a mandatory feature of an extensional theory of tense, and not all extant extensional theories make this assumption. Alternatively, one might replace t * with a time variable which is bound by a λ-binder occurring at the top of the structure. The proposed λ-binder binds all other-wise free time variables in its scope. On this proposal, (9) would have the following logical form:
If the temporalist take this to be the logical form of (9), and then identifies assertoric content with semantic value she gets the result that the assertoric content of (9) is the following temporal proposition:
λw. λt 1 t 1 past λt 2 t 2 Elliott dances c,w,g = λw.λt. there is a time t < t such that Elliot danced at t in w.
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Note that this semantics suffices to show that both the Second Dogma and King's analogue of it fail. The Second Dogma say that if indices fail to contain a time parameter, then the objects of assertion cannot be time-neutral. But here we have a semantic theory without a time parameter in the index and we have time-neutral objects of assertion. King's analogue of the Second Dogma says that if indices fail to contain a time parameter, then semantic values cannot be time-neutral. But again: here we have a semantic theory without a time parameter in the index and we have time-neutral semantic values.
Note that a parallel move could be made in the modal case. Instead of an extensional semantics that has a modal indexical at the top of each structure, a defender of world-neutrality could posit a λ-binder at the top of the structure which binds otherwise-free world variables. The result would be world-neutral semantic values, and so if we identify semantic value and assertoric content, we will get world-neutral assertoric contents as well.
Earlier I alluded to the fact that theories of this kind can be found in the literature. Schlenker (2004) discusses a theory which posits three λ-binders at the top of each structure, one binding otherwise-free world variables, one binding otherwise-free time variables, and one binding otherwise-free first-person pronouns, thus making semantic values/assertoric contents centered propositions. Similarly, in his extensional theory of modality, Percus (2000) posits a λ-binder at the topic of each structure binding otherwise-free variables over possible situations, thus making semantic values/assertoric contents world-neutral.
Our second strategy for reconciling an extensional treatment of tense with time-neutral contents applies only to assertoric content. Part of the argument against temporalism ran like this: Since indices contain only possible worlds, a function from indices to truth values is a function from possible worlds to truth values. Since the latter do not vary in truth value over time, the objects of assertion do not vary in truth value over time either. But this argument depends on identifying functions from indices to truth values -semantic values -with assertoric contents. But as we learned in section 2 of this paper, this way of defining the notion of assertoric content is not obligatory. So the temporalist can resist this argument by adopting a different definition of assertoric content. In particular, she can accept the foregoing extensional semantics and retain temporalism if she takes the assertoric content of a sentence φ at a context c to be the temporal diagonal of φ at c:
Temporal Diagonal of φ at c: λ w, t . φ w,t,xc ,w,g Given this definition of assertoric content, we get the result that the assertoric content of (9) is a temporal proposition, one that is true at a world-time pair w, t just in case Elliot danced at some time t prior to t in w: λ w, t . t * past λt 2 t 2 Elliott dances w,t,xc ,w,g = λ w, t . there is a time t < t such that Elliot dances at t in w.
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So if the temporalist accepts this definition of assertoric content, she can accept this particular extensional semantics for tense.
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27 A more detailed computation: λ w, t . t * past λt 2 t 2 Elliott dances w,t,xc ,w,g = λ w, t .[ past w,t,xc ,w,g ( λt 2 t 2 Elliott dances w,t,xc ,w,g )( t * w,t,xc ,w,g )] = λ w, t .[ past w,t,xc ,w,g (λt . Elliot dances at t in w)(t)] = λ w, t . there is a time t < t such that [λt . Elliot dances at t in w](t ) = 1 = λ w, t . there is a time t < t such that Elliot dances at t in w 28 Our two versions of temporalism will agree on the assertoric content of all sentences that do not contain temporal indexicals like "now" or "today". But the second, diagonal account Note again that a similar strategy would also allow us to combine an extensional account of modality with a commitment to world-neutral objects of assertion. If we have an extensional theory of modality similar to this extensional theory of tense, then identifying the assertoric content of φ at c with either the temporal diagonal of φ at c or the diagonal proposition of φ at c will result in world-neutral objects of assertion:
Diagonal Proposition of φ at c: λw. φ w,tc,xc ,w,g Thus, an advocate of time-neutral contents can accept an extensional treatment of tense, and an advocate of world-neutral contents can accept an extensional treatment of modality, so long as each makes the right assumptions about logical form and chooses the right definition of assertoric content. It isn't the extensional nature of the semantics that provides theorists like Stanley and King with an argument against time-neutral contents, but rather certain specific features of certain specific extensional theories.
Summary
As Lewis showed, if indices contain a parameter X, the objects of assertion may nevertheless be X-specific. This observation allowed us to formulate a version of contextualism about epistemic modals which is immune to the relativist's argument. And as we have argued, the converse of Lewis's point is also true: even if indices fail to contain a parameter X, the objects of assertion may nevertheless be X-neutral. Thus, one cannot argue from an extensional treatment of tense or modality to the claim that the objects of assertion are temporally or modally specific.
